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JP(61)Note 38

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10th September, 1961.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN

Note by the Directors of Plans

The Prime Minister has requested certain information in connection with both the military measures which we have so far agreed for the protection of aircraft in the Berlin corridor and what measures for the defence of access to Berlin by air we may be asked to consider if these already authorized prove insufficient.

21. We set out as an Annex to this Note, a draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister.

(Signed) J.M. TOWNLEY
W.C. SMITH
P.A. KENNEDY.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

• COS.1135/10/9/61

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AIR ACCESS TO BERLINDraft Memorandum for the Prime Minister

1. Tripartite air access plans, grouped under the code name JACK PINE provide for air transport operations to cover a garrison airlift, a civil airlift, a combination of the two, the evacuation of non-combatants and selected aliens and air tactical operations designed to maintain air access through the corridors to Berlin. There is also a quadripartite plan for the supply of Berlin by air. Under these plans allied escorts may engage and open fire if our aircraft are attacked by hostile aircraft and may pursue attackers to a limited extent. Operational control would be centralized under CINCUSAFE. H.M. Government has agreed to these plans without commitment.

2. General Norstad has been concerned that Allied response to interference with air access would not be immediate or properly concerted, and made various proposals to overcome these difficulties. These were being considered when it became apparent that an emergency might arise in connection with a German rally in Berlin (Tag der Heimat). To deal with this situation the three Governments decided to use military transports if the emergency materialized, escorted if necessary and operating in our case under JACK PINE rules of engagement. The Americans issued more restrictive rules unilaterally.

3. Further proposals were then received from General Norstad and H.M. Government's decisions so far are reflected in the answers to your specific questions.

Measures Agreed So Far

The measures specifically agreed by H.M. Government are:-

- (a) The necessary communications essential to the operation of the JACK PINE Command post at Ramstein be installed immediately and that the post be manned on a minimum basis.
- (b) In the event of an emergency this command post will be used to co-ordinate and control the movement of all transports in the air corridor.
- (c) When General Norstad considers the situation warrants a part of the JACK PINE transport and fighter force may be brought to an appropriate state of readiness.

Unlimited Limits of Counter-Attack

Under present JACK PINE plans tripartite fighters are authorized to engage and open fire on USSR/GDR aircraft only when the latter actually fire at or in the direction of tripartite fighter or transport aircraft, or as may be specifically authorized or directed by CINCUSAFE acting in compliance with instructions of the designated overall commander.

In the event of unprovoked armed attack against tripartite forces engaged in operations under this plan, IMMEDIATE PURSUIT is authorized. IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will be limited to the degree necessary to protect tripartite personnel, property, and to

Annex (Continued)

achieve the plan objectives. It is subject to the following restrictions:-

- (a) IMMEDIATE PURSUIT will not include prolonged pursuit deep into hostile airspace.
- (b) Commanders will not be authorized to organize a pursuing force deliberately.
- (c) IMMEDIATE PURSUIT authority will apply only to specific incidents.

7. In the event of allied aircraft coming under Ground to Air fire, they will take evasive action and withdraw. The incident will be reported and further Governmental guidance will be provided. The decision to attack ground targets is reserved to Governments.

Measures awaiting Agreement

8. The United Kingdom view is that subject to tripartite agreement being reached on the following principles, and if JACK PINE is brought into effect, the instructions issued unilaterally by the United States to meet the emergency mentioned in paragraph 2 would be acceptable to us for extension to British aircraft participating in the operation:-

- (a) If civil flights cease, either because clearance has been refused or because for other reasons the airlines decide it is too dangerous to fly, military transport aircraft should immediately be sent in but without fighter escort.
- (b) If the civilian flights are suspended as a result of physical action against a civilian aircraft (e.g. forcing down) the military aircraft should be accompanied by fighters.
- (c) Fighter aircraft would be supplied immediately there were any harassment of military transports.
- (d) If any of our aircraft, civil or military, are forced down we should make an immediate appeal to the Security Council under Chapter 6 (Threat to Peace). Escorted flights by military transport planes would continue.

The American instructions are in fact virtually in line with these principles.

Possible Further Measures

9. We may be asked to mount a civil aircraft probe manned by a service crew in the event of a Soviet/GDR threat to close the air corridor. The purpose of this would be to ensure that a military air lift was not implemented as a result of an accident, to raise alarm and to prevent loss of civil access by default. This might have to be continued under military arrangements.

10. The new directive to General Norstad from the Ambassadorial group envisages extending present JACK PINE plans to include a large number of possible measures, such as attacks on S.A.M. sites

Annex (Concluded)

A.A. sites and airfields outside the corridor. We may also wish to neutralize such targets as balloons, and other possible obstructions in the corridor, or artillery sites threatening our airfields in Berlin.

11. With regard to direct measures of interference we would be unlikely to achieve our aim of keeping open the air corridor by attempting to maintain local air superiority because of the superior numbers of Soviet/GDR fighters, A.A. and S.A.M.. A token attack could be mounted against a selected airfield, A.A. or S.A.M. site but this could be no more than a gesture to demonstrate our strength of purpose. If this stage is reached air access to Berlin will have been effectively blocked and a new political situation will have arisen.